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Introduction
Recent research indicates that shocks to the rate at which current investment is transformed into future capital are important drivers of business cycles.
For instance, Tambalotti (2010, 2011) argue that such shocks to the marginal e¢ ciency of investment (MEI) are the most important driving force behind aggregate ‡uctuations accounting for 50% of the variance in US output since 1954. However, attributing a central role to MEIshocks is problematic because the shocks a¤ect the cost of consumption in terms of capital forgone. Hence, while consumption co-moves positively with other macroeconomic variables such as investment and output in the data, conventional macro models tend to imply that MEI-shocks move consumption in the opposite direction of output and investment. This co-movement problem is present even in studies which argue that MEI-shocks are the main driver of business cycles, such as Tambalotti (2010 and and Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008) . 1 In addition, the response of consumption contradicts the VAR evidence, which suggests a signi…cant increase in consumption on impact of a positive MEI shock, cf. Peersman and Straub (2007) .
In this paper, we propose an explanation why consumption may co-move with other real variables in response to MEI-shocks. The explanation we pursue is that part of the population are rule-of-thumb consumers who do 1 The impulse response of consumption to MEI-shocks is negative and signi…cant for the …rst …ve to eight quarters in these models. Moreover, the model by Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010) underestimates the unconditional correlation between consumption and investment considerably, as it is positive in the data and negative in the model. The disconnect between consumption and investment is re ‡ected in the variance decomposition, Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man (1988) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) propose preferences with low or no wealth e¤ect on labor supply together with variable capacity utilization. Guerrieri, Henderson and Kim (2010) obtain co-movement in a two-sector model. Furlanetto and Seneca (2010) show that a combination of non-separable preferences and nominal rigidities deliver co-movement under very general parameterizations. Eusepi and Preston (2009) emphasize heterogeneity in consumption between employed and unemployed workers. Khan and Tsoukalas (2011) combine some of these ingredients and show how is it possible to obtain co-movement in an estimated model.
Beyond providing a simple explanation why consumption responds positively to MEI-shocks, our results contribute to the literature on rule-of-thumb consumers in macro models. Previous studies in this strand have primarily focused on explaining the e¤ects of …scal shocks (GLV, 2007, and Mankiw, 2000) and neutral technology shocks (Furlanetto and Seneca, 2011) , and on the monetary policy stance required to prevent equilibrium indeterminacy (GLV, 2004 , Bilbiie, 2008 , and Natvik, 2009 . As recent evidence from estimated models points toward MEI shocks as the main driver of business cycles, our …nding is the potentially most important reason why macroeconomic models should account for rule-of-thumb behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie ‡y presents the model and its calibration. Results are presented in section 3. Section 4 discusses the role of wage rigidity. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
We consider a New Keynesian DSGE model with sticky wages, sticky prices, endogenous capital accumulation, capital adjustment costs and rule-of-thumb consumers. Essentially, our model is the one proposed by GLV (2007) augmented with wage stickiness. We therefore go straight to presenting the log-linear version of the model. We use lower-case letters to denote variables in log-deviations from steady state, and upper-case letters without time subscripts to express steady state values.
We focus our interest on the MEI shock, m t , which a¤ects the trasformation of current investment,i t , into future capital, k t+1 , as can be seen in the capital accumulation equation
where is the depreciation rate. The shock follows the exogenous process
where m measures the persistence of the shock and e m;t is an i.i.d. shock.
The economy consists of a continuum of …rms, a continuum of households, A fraction of households are rule-of-thumb consumers. These consumers simply consume their respective disposable incomes each period:
Here w t is the nominal wage, p t is the price level and n r t is the number of hours worked by each rule-of-thumb agent.
The remaining fraction (1 ) of households are optimizers, who have access to both …nancial and capital markets. Hence, they choose plans for consumption, c o t , according to a standard Euler equation obtained from the maximization of a log-separable utility function:
where r t represents the nominal interest rate and t is the price in ‡ation rate.
The presence of capital adjustment costs implies the following dynamics for Tobin's q:
Here is the discount rate, r k t denotes the rental rate of capital. Optimizing households choose investment, i t , to maximize life-time utility according to the following equation
where is the elasticity of investment with respect to q.
Aggregate variables for consumption (c t ) and hours (n t ) are given as simple weighted averages:
Wages are set by unions, each representing a di¤erentiated type of labor service supplied by households. Wage rigidity is introduced by assuming adjustment costs as in Rotemberg (1982) , which implies a New Keynesian
Philips curve for wage in ‡ation, w t , given as
Here represents the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity, w = (" w 1) = w with " w representing the elasticity of substitution across labor varieties, and w is the cost of adjusting wages. Firms do not discriminate between consumer types in their labor demand, and so it follows from the unions'problems that n
Each …rm produces one of the di¤erentiated goods. It does so by combining rented capital with a homogenous labor input constructed as a DixitStiglitz aggregate of the di¤erentiated labor services supplied by households.
Cost minimization implies that relative factor inputs satisfy the condition
Up to a …rst-order approximation, production (y t ) is given by
where is the capital share in a Cobb-Douglas production function. Firms set their price according to a staggered Calvo-mechanism, and stand ready to satisfy demand at the chosen price. As is well-known, the optimality conditions from this problem imply the New Keynesian Phillips curve
p , p is the probability of keeping the price …xed for the period, and mc t is the real marginal cost given as mc t = (w t p t ) (y t n t )
The central bank controls the risk-free interest rate, which it sets according to the rule
is a coe¢ cient larger than one that measure the response to in ‡a-tion.
Market clearing requires that
where G measures the ratio of government spending to output.
To facilitate comparison, our calibration follows GLV. Hence, we consider a time period to be a quarter, and we set = However, the introduction of wage rigidities increases the range of parameter values for which the equilibrium is determinate, cf. Colciago (2011) .
This allows us to set more realistic values for some parameters. We therefore set = 1 (instead of 0.2) and p = 0:5 (instead of 0.75) in order to reduce the high degrees of labor supply elasticity and nominal ridigity assumed by GLV. Similarly, we set = 7 to strike a balance between the value of 1 used by GLV and the value of 13.3 motivated in Woodford (2003) . 3 Results In our baseline calibration, is set to 0:5 in order to conform with the original literature on rule-of-thumb consumers, cf. GLV (2007) or Campbell and Mankiw (1989) . This may be an unrealistically high value given the more recent empirical evidence (López-Salido and Rabanal, 2008, estimate 3 In fact, the impact response is very similar to the one in Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010) . This is not surprising given that our model without rule-of-thumb consumers is similar to the one in their paper. Their model also features habit persistence in consumption, variable capacity utilisation and indexation in prices and wages. These ingredients do not play an important role in the transmission of MEI shocks, however (cf. Furlanetto and Seneca, 2010) . Notice that the response is less persistent than in Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010) Coenen and Straub, 2005, obtain values between 0.25 to 0.37 depending on the speci…cation for taxes) 4 . Figure   2 shows that the positive response of consumption is robust to reducing to 30 per cent (dashed lines). 5 The …gure also shows that our result does not rely on both price and wage rigidity. Wage rigidity alone is enough to generate a positive consumption response (dashed-dotted line). However, some degree of nominal rigidity is needed; when both wages and prices are ‡exible, the consumption response is negative (dotted line).
4 The Role of Wage Rigidity
We have augmented the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb consumers developed by GLV with nominal wage rigidity. Aside from empirical relevance, our main motivation for imposing wage rigidity is that rule-of-thumb consumption makes equilibrium dynamics highly sensitive to speci…c assump- 4 Kaplan and Violante (2011) provide a micro-foundation for rule-of-thumb behavior.
They argue that it re ‡ects not only the behavior of credit constrained households (below 10% of US households according to data on the wealth distribution) but also the behavior of "wealthy hand-to-mouth" households. These households (around 30% of the total) hold some illiquid wealth but optimally choose to consume all disposable income to avoid transaction and liquidation costs. 5 Importantly, for a given share of constrained agents the consumption multiplier could become much larger with higher price rigidity, or in a more complex model with strategic complementarities in price setting or non-separabilities in the utility function. In the baseline version of our model the minimum value of consistent with a positive consumption response is 0.22. 6 This can be seen analitically by considering the equilibrium condition for the labor market, which, in the absence of nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition, equalizes the marginal rate of substitution with the marginal product of labor.
tions if wages are ‡exible. For example, the labor supply elasticity must be very high and the steady-state tax schedule must be highly egalitarian in order for the model to have a determinate equilibrium. This is no longer the case with a moderate degree of wage rigidity as shown by Colciago (2011) for the labor supply elasticity and by Natvik (2011) for the steady state tax schedule, respectively. Similarly, wage rigidity makes equilibrium dynamics robust to variation in the degree of substitutability between the labor services provided by the two types of households, cf. Furlanetto (2011) and Natvik (2011) . Hence, with sticky wages, we may base our analysis on a labor supply elasticity within the range normally considered in macro models, and our results are not driven by arbitrary assumptions regarding the steady state distribution of wealth or the substitutability between labor services.
In addition to this, we now point to a further implication of wage rigidity.
Wage rigidity matters for the distinction between rule-of-thumb behavior and non-separable preferences, both of which may explain the co-movement of consumption with other macroeconomic variables following MEI shocks (see Furlanetto and Seneca, 2010 , for a discussion of non-separable preferences in this regard). While these explanations are conceptually di¤erent -with the former alluding to credit market imperfections and the latter to preferences -they give rise to similar consumption dynamics in standard models.
Speci…cally, when wages are ‡exible the two explanations lead to observationally equivalent Euler equations for aggregate consumption, cf. e.g. GLV (2007), Linnemann (2006) and Basu and Kimball (2002) . When wages are sticky, however, the Euler equation derived from a model with rule-of-thumb behavior is no longer observationally equivalent to one derived from a model with optimizing agents with non-separable preferences.
To illustrate this point, we construct an aggregate Euler equation for our model economy by combining equations (1), (2) and (3):
Here, is the di¤erence operator. Now, if wages were ‡exible, the real wage term on the right-hand side could be replaced by the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, leaving us with the following aggregate Euler equation:
where
, and e = 1 W N P C
1
. This equation has the same form as one derived from a model with non-separable preferences. 7 By contrast, when wages are rigid, we cannot substitute in the marginal rate of substitution for the real wage and go from (4) to (5). Hence, the two Euler equations are no longer observationally equivalent. In principle, therefore, wage rigidity provides a way to empirically distinguish non-separable preferences from rule-of-thumb consumers. This is interesting from a policy perspective because rule-of-thumb behavior, unlike non-separable preferences, may re ‡ect a friction, that policy should address.
Conclusion
We have shown that rule-of-thumb behavior can explain why consumption and investment co-move after shocks to the marginal e¢ ciency of investment.
7 For instance, with preferences of the type proposed by King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) , the Euler equation for the representative household is given by (5). Only, now, the coe¢ cients have a slightly di¤erent composition as = 1 1 W N=P C and e = , where is the representative household's coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
New Keynesian models, which struggle to account for co-movement patterns observed in the data. Because recent evidence points to MEI shocks as the historically most important driver of business cycles, our …nding constitutes an additional reason why rule-of-thumb behavior should be accounted for in macroeconomic models, beyond their role in the transmission of …scal and technology shocks emphasized elsewhere. 
